

THE INDONESIA'S GLOBAL MARITIME AXIS (GMA) POLICY UNDER JOKOWI

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Abstract

President Jokowi has introduced Indonesia Global Maritime Axis (GMA) Policy in 2016 to enhance maritime security. As an archipelago's Country, Indonesia need to have a very strong policy to protect its territory. This paper will attempt to explain the mechanisms taken by Indonesia to protect its national interests and maritime sovereignty using GMA policy from 2016- 2018. It has three objectives: namely 1) to describe the Global Maritime Axis (GMA) Policy; 2) to discuss the Challenges of GMA Policy in Maritime Security; and 3) to discuss the Major Power responses towards GMA Policy. This study will use secondary data. Secondary data was collected from literature reviews based on scientific publications, theses, journal articles, and online material, such as newspaper articles. Primary data was also obtained from professional respondents from abroad through electronic media such as email. The findings of this study show that, 1) GMA Policy indirectly has raised Indonesia's economy, 2) GMA Policy has maintain Indonesia's maritime sovereignty as well as control over the sea resources, while also ensuring safety in maritime security and 3) Indonesia has comprehensive cooperation with regional countries in order to gain earn the trust and continued with ambition as a maritime country.

Keywords: GMA Policy, Indonesia, Maritime Security, National Interest, Economy

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Introduction

Since 1960's, under Suharto's administration has been characterized by pragmatism, caution and simplicity (Witular 2014). Thus, Indonesia is a focus on regional cooperation in terms of economic and ethnic relations with its neighbours rather than conflict as the composition of external engagement. Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis in the 1990s and the calamity of the 9/11 terrorist attacks had made Indonesia reassess the purpose, place and position of Indonesia in the international community. Meanwhile, under the government of President Jokowi, Indonesia had a firm dedication on to achieving positive economic growth and plans to construct its infrastructure, especially in eastern Indonesia such as the western islands of Java and Sumatra.

Thus, President Jokowi has emerged to enforce the *Three Principles* (Trisakti) called the Normative Guidelines for envisioning Indonesia being an independent nation with a developing economic system and multicultural order (Detik News 2015). In conformity with the Jokowi is trying to change the nation's diplomatic posture and stimulate to become a nation's maritime primary in an economy. The Global Maritime Axis policy's main idea is to enhance the country's maritime identity, thus Jokowi will utilise the maritime around the Indonesian archipelago to boost the country's economy rather than being considered as a natural disadvantage. To achieve the desired idea, there is a necessity for protection against traditional and non-traditional threats to Indonesia's internal as well as external security (Detik News 2015).

The Global Maritime Axis Policy (GMA) Objective

The GMA's aim is to enhance the connectivity and maritime infrastructures such as the construction of sea-lane communication, infrastructures, marine ports and logistics communications assets which has the potential to enhance the maritime tourism, fisheries and maritime sectors (Joko and Jusuf 2014). It also aims to modernize the maritime tourism sector, promoting fishermen's activities and native marine industries. This has the potential to promote the empowerment of the food security for Indonesia. The new maritime doctrines emphasize on the reinterpretation of Indonesia's interest as the largest archipelago country in the world's, which is located go-strategically at the convergence of major interests (Joko and Jusuf 2014).

In Jokowi's maritime policy, has to strive to reverse on national's foreign policy and renew the nation's international affairs are based on the significant points of archipelago (Joko and Jusuf 2014). First, National's maritime diplomacy to promote a border dispute resolution among neighbouring countries. Furthermore, its avoid loss of economic aspects of those had countries involved in longer period if it is not resolved immediately. Thus, the Indonesian government had promoted the cooperation of strategic industrial relations within countries participant such as includes marine and defence industry. Second, maintaining the integrity of the maritime sovereignty, security and social towards outer islands. The Indonesian government had redesigned the defence plan includes the emergence the Indonesia Armed Force's capability as the main sea guard towards its maritime territory. Third, to protect the country's resources and the *Exclusive Economic Zone* (EEZ) by modernising the Indonesian Armed Forces and local maritime authorities agency. Indonesia also had encouraged the maritime partnership arrangement between Asia Pacific region countries to strengthen the security elements within the EEZ. Fourth, establishing the Intensify Defence diplomacy by conduct military exercises partnership with Asia Pacific countries. Jokowi had the intent to conduct a military bilateral exercises between the military units from Asia Pacific to suit his vision of expanding the influences and maintaining security within the maritime region. At the same time, Jokowi encourages the neighbourhood countries to maintaining a selected the commercial maritime approach for mutual benefits. These initiatives were in form of cooperation such as Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), Joint Patrol Navies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (MALSINDO), Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP) and the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP). Fifth, reducing maritime competition among the Superpowers and resolve the territorial disputes in the region by implementing peace agreements such as China and India. The Indonesian government realise that as nation maritime is required a keep maintaining a relationship with Major Power countries for gains the economic growth and strengthen the maritime security territory.

Promoting the GMA concept, Jokowi's intent was to set Indonesia as an influential maritime nation in the Pan Indo-Pacific (PACINDO) region ((Joko and Jusuf 2014). Jokowi is interested in the idea of interconnected Pacific and Pan Indo-Pacific's lines, which has served as the main

theatre of Indonesia's foreign policy involvement. Therefore, Indonesia is enhancing to improve diplomatic presence in the region by implementing the policy manners: (1) Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN Summit as a platform for encourage on unity among countries: (2) Strengthening the position and cooperation within the regional group: (3) Striving and encourage a bilateral strategic partnerships: (4) As a manager to control the regional of commerce a collaboration and peaceful commerce for government beneficial; and (5) Advertising an integration a maritime culture, especially under the Indian Ocean Circle Association (IORA).

Map 1 Indonesian Territory



Source:

https://www.google.com/search?q=indonesia+territory+map&rlz=1C1GCEB_enMY786MY786&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8IJKsnYPgAhUNfSsKHTqODdoQ_AUIDigB&biw=1517&bih=641#imgrc=XxRyKj4uhsWUbm


The New of Maritime Doctrine

With the new maritime doctrine, Indonesia inspired the development of the defence and military capability aspect for formidable regional naval power ((Joko and Jusuf 2014). The Indonesian government restructured the existing defence planning strategy and emphasized on the idea of empowering the Strategy Minimum Essential Force (MEF). The Indonesian government had announced that the significance of developing the defence system is not excluding the act of protecting the territorial integrity of Indonesia's marine resources. The protection of the sea lanes to sail through this nation was considered as a primary focus for the strategy. In addition, Jokowi

informed clearly that his nation would keep the existing vision to further better the existing strategic industrial relations and encourage cooperation with the countries participating in the defence industry.

Indonesia's maritime plan was designed with the allocation of having a strategic bearing within the PACINDO. Thus, the Sea Toll Road Project is significant as it connects five major ports and has the potential to be developed as an expansion plan for the inter-island sea line communication and strengthening its maritime security in 2015.¹ The project aims to reduce the burden of the expensive cost, encourage Indonesia's commerce, domestic, especially between and beyond its maritime border. As regards, the project had five strategic seaports such as Belawan in North Sumatra, Tanjung Priok in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak, Surabaya in East Java, Makassar in South Sulawesi, Sorong in Papua and some mini seaports within the nation. Therefore, Indonesia also had maritime plans which are to park as an international commercial hub within ASEAN and Indo Pacific regions.

Map 2 Indonesia's Sea-Lane Toll Programme



Source: <http://dephub.go.id/welcome/readPost/dukung-tol-laut-lewat-empat-fokus-kerja-kemenhub>.

¹ Here comes the sea toll road. (2015, November 11). *The Jakarta post*. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/11/editorial-here-comes-sea-toll-road.html>.

Based on Map 2, the Indonesian government should bear the burden of controlling the cost of the project because of this maritime transportation.² In addition, the success of this operation depends on whether the user satisfaction traders and producers use the service more often. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Planning, implementation projects require marine toll road investment and operating costs were high. The cost of the ambitious project was estimated at IDR 700 trillion (USD 53 billion) which would produce 24 commercial ports, 1,481 non-commercial ports, and 15 industrial zones with the inclusion of new ships (Natahadibrata (2014). These investments cannot be accommodated by the government finances and therefore Indonesia should seek financial support from foreign countries for the mutual benefit from the project for the long term.³ So, Indonesia should consider taking action initiatives with ASEAN countries in the region to cover the cost of the mega project.

The Challenges of GMA Policy in Maritime Security

(I) Non-Traditional Threats

Indonesia is confronted with threats from various non-state actors that seem to want not only to disrupt the national security but also to disintegrate the state.⁴ Indonesia's issues in dealing with security threats can be viewed in different angles: the armed separatists, radical Islamic organizations and militias, and factions involved in the difference between cultural and religious warfare in the area. Historically, Indonesia has witnessed numerous religious and ethnic conflicts along with the call for the disintegration of the State through a number of separatist movements. This tendency still prevails as many of the non-state actors, by capitalising on the prevailing economic and social weaknesses, seek to meet their end goals.⁵

² Dukung Tol Laut Lewat Empat Fokus Kerja. *Kementerian Perhubungan Republik Indonesia*. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from <http://dephub.go.id/welcome/readPost/dukung-tol-laut-lewat-empat-fokus-kerja-kemenhub>.

³ Indonesia Report: Construction Market Update. (2016, December). *Rider Levett Bucknall*, Jakarta. Retrieved April 12, 2018, from <http://assets.rlb.com/production/2017/05/16064534/RLB-Construction-Market-Update-Indonesia-Q4-2016>.

⁴ The Defence Minister of Indonesian. (2015). Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2015. *Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta, ISBN 978-979-8878-04-6, 21–22.

⁵ The Defence Minister of Indonesian. (2015). Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2015. *Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta.


Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, there has been a group of religious extremists had intent to enforce the Sharia Law and it was revealed to influence in Indonesian society since twenty years ago, especially the Conservative Islamic (Rabasa and Hasemen 2002). Furthermore, the 9/11 tragedy is the beginning of an era of Jihad-Salafism who makes hyper-violent action and its expansion in Indonesia (Riviere 2016). Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is one of the major Jihadist groups in Indonesia who were the mastermind behind the 2000's terror attacks on the Australian Embassy, the first and the second incident of the suicide bombings in Bali and the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton were bombed in 2009. Actually, the JI's objective is to establish an Islamic country but opposed to Salafi Jihad's agenda in the regional or global (Riviere 2016).

The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had escalated the presence in the area has an inspiring the impact on Jihadist-Salafism in Southeast Asia, escalate more phobia on vandalism and the potential for new cross-border alliances (Hwang 2014). Indonesia is a vast archipelago, which makes it vulnerable to illegal immigration of illicit entities into its soil, along with the existence of weak law enforcement institutions, prevailing economic distress, unrestrained militia, and politics that protect the extremists from being taken action by the government. This makes it very attractive for international terrorists to open their networks in Indonesia while collaborating with the existing domestic radical Islamic organisations. However, there have a various the network problems due to the difference in the objectives and methods as well as cooperation from international terrorists with domestic extremists. Thus, today Indonesia, like other Southeast Asian countries, faces the challenge of the growing of ISIS to inspire terrorism activities (Hwang 2014).

For Indonesia, maritime piracy and armed robbery are the internal issues that should be addressed by internal security agencies without support from other foreign countries (Gindarsah & Priamarizki 2015). Apart from patrolling the waters that are aligned in the littoral states, it is still hesitant to participate in the efforts of the multilateral non-ASEAN to combat piracy, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement sponsored by the Japanese for Combating Piracy and Robbers Armed Fighting Ships (ReCAAP) in Asia. Furthermore, the Indonesian government has established the Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) to coordinate the joint of maritime

patrol an effectively, including the involvement of 12 maritime law enforcement agencies in order to protect its maritime sovereignty (Saragih 2014).

Map 3 Location of the Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery Incidents in Indonesia (2017)



Source: <http://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/2018/01/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202017.pdf>

In reference to Map 3, the lowest number of incidents is 2015 and 2016 within a five year period in Indonesia's maritime territorial.⁶ The improvement because of the Indonesian maritime law enforcement agencies had a presence to enhance security activities and work for hand in hand with the group of the maritime commercial by sharing the information. Plus, awareness to be vigilant among a chief and crew of the ship/ vessel during sailing along in vital areas.⁷ In 2017, the incident report is 33 cases compared with 32 cases in 2016. Of these, 30 events occurred on ships/vessels during anchor and three incidents during aboard ship. Furthermore, the worst

⁶ Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report 2017. (2017), Singapore, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Infinite Studios. Retrieved May 2, 2018, 17, from <http://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/2018/01/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202017>.

⁷ Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report 2017. (2017), Singapore, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Infinite Studios, 18.

incident is reported that a barge *Ever Omega* towed by tugboat *Ever Prosper* in the waters of Singkawang, Indonesia was hijacked and Kernel Palm Kernel Oil (CPKO) has been lost on 22nd November 2017.⁸

In 2016, the Indonesia National Narcotic Agency (BNN) had announced that approximately five million Indonesian people were involved with abuse of various types of drugs such as crystal methamphetamine 'Shabu' (Rakhmat 2018). So, the international authority also considers the country to have a major problem in the Southeast Asia region. Even though local law enforcer against drug abuse activities, they are vulnerable to decrease the drug trafficking activity. It is also growing due to the lack of education regarding the effects of drug abuse among the population and in addition, the country is less concerned to allocate sufficient funds for anti-drug education (Rakhmat 2018). Since 2017, under Jokowi's administration has launched *Narcotic Emergency* and issued orders to shoot who perpetrator to produce, dealer, or use illegal drugs.⁹ However, it cannot fully succeed and in fact, the number of reported drug crimes in Indonesia has been escalating since 2015. The Malacca Strait in Western part and the Celebes Sea have been common approaches for smugglers four hundred years. In 2015-2018, BNN and Indonesian National Police (POLRI) had been reported that the highest towards smuggling cases via these sea lanes (Rakhmat 2018).

Furthermore, almost 32 million of Indonesians who living below the poverty and human trafficking is become a pressing problem.¹⁰ Thus, thousands of Indonesians are faced with this chain problems caused hardship and limited employment opportunities. More stressful that individuals or groups have taken advantage of as an illegal agency to trafficked people for their own self-esteem. As a result, most people in Indonesia have been trafficked or exploited within the country abroad, in Asian countries and also close to the east, including the Middle East,

⁸Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report 2017. (2017), *Singapore, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Infinite Studios*, 19.

⁹ Indonesia police order to shoot drug dealer to tackle 'narcotics emergency', (2017, July 23). *The Guardian*. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/23/indonesia-police-ordered-to-shoot-drug-dealers-to-tackle-narcotics-emergency>.

¹⁰ Human Trafficking In Indonesia: The Difficult Road Home. (2016, July 13). *nexusinstitute.net*. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from <https://nexusinstitute.net/2017/06/16/human-trafficking-in-indonesia-the-difficult-road-home>.

Africa and Latin America.¹¹ Indonesian government continues to prosecute trafficking offenders, but it only can eradicate the problem limited due to deficiency of provisions to help protect victims of human trafficking and the deficiency of proper data collection and comprehensive.¹² The Minister for Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (MWECP) try to increase the number of task forces at the local level, but the lack of coordination of various layers of defence had affected the national anti-trafficking strategies and government's efforts. Therefore, the government is required to provide more protection services for victims and strengthen the implementation of Law No. 39 of 2004 on the Placement and Protection of Overseas Workers.¹³

Another major issue that poses a threat to Indonesia is an illegal fishery. It needs to enhance its naval capabilities in order to deploy them to contain this illegal practice (Arsana, A. (2017). Apart from this, Indonesia's need for military and enforcement expansion also comes from the necessity to continually deploy its forces for anti-piracy and drug smuggling control missions. Further, Indonesia has one of the most expansive landmasses with 17,508 islands and a total area of 741,903 square miles and a coastline of 29,550 miles; stretching from the SCS, the Celebes Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean, making it a huge undertaking to provide maritime security and vigilance (Arsana 2017). On this, the major emphasis is towards strengthening the security of Indonesian maritime territory by increasing the purchase of maritime patrol aircraft, including multiple rocket launcher system, air defence missiles, assault and attack helicopters.¹⁴ So, Indonesia's escalating the external security challenge, which has seen enhance the military outreach of the Indonesian Armed Forces and enforcement, made it required to seek self-sufficiency in its defence and maritime capabilities as well.

¹¹ Human Trafficking In Indonesia: The Difficult Road Home. (2016, July 13). *nexusinstitute.net*.

¹² Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons: 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report. (2014). US Department Of State: Diplomacy in action. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2014/226741.htm>.

¹³ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons: 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report. (2014). US Department Of State: Diplomacy in action.

¹⁴ Indonesia–Defence Equipment. Export. (2017, June 27). *Export.Gov*. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Indonesia-Defense-Equipment>.

(II) Weakness of the Regional Organization

Indonesia's challenge is its external security because of the weakness of regional multilateral organizations failing to address key security issues.¹⁵ As the main member of ASEAN, the government is consistently stating that Indonesia has remained close together with ASEAN and its part major in Indonesian Foreign Policy for enhancing the collaboration and uphold the spirit of ASEAN. However, it has also shown to be independent from that reliance on ASEAN as it would not help Indonesia in addressing the evolving challenges. After the formation of ASEAN, Indonesia has relied upon the Western presence in Southeast Asia until the time the nations became capable of assuming the regional security role themselves in 1968. Furthermore, Indonesia wanted the US presence in order to ensure protection against the China with its assertive actions in the region. This is while not establishing any formal security arrangement with the US to avoid a direct conflict with Indonesia's stance on non-alignment. This security arrangement with the US was needed as ASEAN, as a group, had failed to address the issues of security.¹⁶

One cause for this could be that ASEAN had and continues to suffer from a deep-seated historical suspicion prevailing amongst its member states (David 2014). With many of the ASEAN countries having unsettled territorial disputes with each other, this often has a lack of unanimity for the passing of any solution. The persistence of intra-ASEAN disputes and conflicts, along with the economic and military compulsions of individual ASEAN nations to bilaterally engage with other nations, which do not find favour with other ASEAN nations, divides the Association's decision-making process. It retains its ability to progress in higher integration levels if it wanted to create a real community to ensure stability and security in the region.

As a maritime country, Indonesia also looking beyond ASEAN to strengthen its function in the region by maritime collaboration with foreign countries through the Indian Ocean Rim

¹⁵ National Intelligence Estimate NIE 55-68. (1968, December 31). *Prepared by the CIA titled Initial Report on Suharto*. Retrieved May 5, 2018, from http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsaebb/nsaebb242/1968_nie-55-68.pdf.

¹⁶ National Intelligence Estimate NIE 55-68. (1968, December 31). *Prepared by the CIA titled Initial Report on Suharto*.

Association (IORA) (Marsudi 2017). On 7th April 2017, the Indonesian government has stated that manoeuvring as a monitor within the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, they will facilitate the IORA as regional architecture to explore in the Indian Ocean and support to maintain as the backbone of the global economy, security and stability. In March 2017, Jakarta hosted the 20th Anniversary of the IORA. With Indonesia as the Chair of the Association, the first-ever IORA Concord was signed.¹⁷ The idea of the agreement is to transform the IORA that would be able to address the new and evolving challenges pertaining a maritime security, an economical investment, promote as a security guarantee for fisheries management development, strengthening a disaster management, collaboration in science and technology and culture. This agreement is the foundation and encourages the cooperation among the countries in the Indian Ocean, which is the most important region in the future.¹⁸ Further, the presence of the IORA leaders and representatives, which included the Presidents and the Prime Ministers from 21 member countries of the IORA, demonstrating the strong commitment to forging regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region (Radja 2017). Thus, Indonesia is required for expanding and seek a larger role in the existing multilateral regimes indicates its realisation of the various shortcomings of the existing institutions. This has urged Indonesia to advance its defence force capabilities in order to confront any possible threat which may arise in case of the inability of the IORA to negotiate an acceptable settlement.

(III) The Unsettled Maritime Delimitation Issue


Since 1960, the Indonesian government has a tent to define the country's maritime domain (Prescott 2013). On 21st March 1980, a Declaration had given that the Indonesian government required for claims the territorial seas an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 200nm wide and reconfirms in Act No.5 on 18th October 1983. But, Indonesia is prevented to claim the end of the eastern the Malacca Strait and in Singapore territory which is its full width of 12nm territorial seas nearby each other with Malaysia and Singapore. This is to prevent the escalated tension of the territorial maritime border and strain relations with neighbouring countries. However,

¹⁷ IORA 20th Commemorative Leaders' Summit. (2017, March 7). *IORA*. Retrieved April 23, 2018, from <http://www.iora.net/en/events-media-news/events/other/20th-leaders-summit/2017/iora-20thcommemorative-leaders-summit>.

¹⁸ 'IORA 20th Commemorative Leaders' Summit. (2017, March 7). *IORA*.

tolerance by the Indonesian government has given their losses because of the Indonesia able claim a limited width EEZ only.

Map 4 Overlapping Claim in the South China Sea




Source: <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-south-china-sea-overfishing-threatens-collapse/>.

In reference to Map 4, Indonesian claims to 200nm wide EEZ overlaps with similar claims of seven neighbours that include: China, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, The Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan (Prescott 2013). The escalating of tension was due to the Natuna Island is the nearest with the overlapping claims by other countries. Therefore, the Indonesian government considers this conflict could be threatening the maritime territorial and may affect the project maritime mega plan for a long-term period. As a result, they are unable to gain the confidence of foreign investors to invest in their projects because of weakness to guarantee security in trade and conflicts that cannot be resolved immediately.

There are also maritime territorial conflicts with countries that include Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore. In 2016, Indonesia had organized the numerous of formal meetings for on the disputed maritime border. Hence, one of the major milestones in the border issue that Indonesia and Singapore were agreed and signed the Treaty of Maritime Border in January 2017 (Marsudi 2017). On 25th September 2017, Singapore and Indonesia jointly submitted a treaty to the United

Nation (UN) for registration that clarifies their maritime border in the Strait of Singapore. The treaty covers the eastern section of Changi and Batam and includes the three accounts for a 67.3 km-long sea border in the Strait of Singapore. But, the treaty excludes the area between Pedra Branca and Bintan Island, which involves Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The treaty is the third for both countries after the first agreement on the maritime boundary along the central part of the Singapore Strait.¹⁹

Map 5 Natuna Island and Overlapping with China's Nine Dash Line




Source: <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/natuna-islands-china-jokowi-pushback/>.

Indonesia's defence spending was increasing due to the tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) although Indonesia is not interested in claiming maritime territory in Spratly or Paracel Islands (Connelly 2017). However, Indonesia's concern was due to China's claim of the SCS based on Nine-Dash Lines and it is within proximity to the Natuna Islands. On July 2017, the Indonesian government had declared that the renamed maritime Northeast of the Natuna Islands as the North Natuna Sea. The location had shown in Map 5. Now, Indonesia's EEZ northeast of the Natuna Island had overlapped with China's Nine Dash Line. In recent years, there has been a number of

¹⁹ Singapore, Indonesia Submit Final Sea Border Treaty to UN as They Celebrate 50th Anniversary of Ties. (2017, September 26). *The Straits Times*. Retrieved May 2, 2018, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/singapore-indonesia-submit-final-sea-border-treaty-to-un-as-they-celebrate-50th>.

cases which Indonesian Armed Forces were arrested Chinese fishing vessels which had entered the overlapping area and its concern over the relations with China.

Map 6 EEZ Northeast of the Natuna Island had overlapped with China's Nine Dash Line



Source: <https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/indonesias-new-north-natuna-sea-whats-in-a-name#gs.lhnImas>.

In 2015, China's government had stated that Indonesia has not shown interest in China's Spratly Islands, while China has recognized the Natuna Island is Indonesia's maritime sovereignty.²⁰ Today, Indonesia had developed the infrastructure around the Natuna Islands and planning the deployment of Indonesia Armed Forces. As regards in Map6, despite the understandings, there were three cases of maritime invasion between Indonesia and China, which involves warning shots and maritime enforcement of Indonesia have seized a Chinese fishing boat and arrested the crew in 2016.²¹

(IV) Rivalry to control the Sea of Lines Communication (SLOCs)

Indonesia had concerns that PACINDO region was going to be a new sea global theatre for SLOC due to developing the economic and energy sectors (Agastia and Perwita 2016).Furthering


²⁰ Indonesia Starts to Confront China's Territorial Claims in the SCS. (2017, September 11). *The Straits Times*. Retrieved May 2, 2018, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-starts-to-confront-chinas-territorial-claims-in-south-china-sea>.

²¹ Indonesia Starts to Confront China's Territorial Claims in the SCS. (2017, September 11). *The Straits Times*.

the context, Jokowi had introduced his GMA policy as a sea guard in the PACINDO region security. However, there were challenges to influence the GMA policy from the region of the Pacific Ocean until south towards India Ocean based on its domestic, bilateral, and multilateral efforts. The PACINDO was divided into five distinct areas which are Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, Taiwan Strait, East and the SCS and the Sea of Japan. These two areas had its own challenges for Jokowi to spread GMA policy towards the oceans.

Historically, the US had influenced the regional security as it was the main guardian to oversee the Indian Ocean maritime sea lanes for entering the Gulf. Nevertheless, India and China were the main competitors spreading its influence after the US influence has decreased in the region (Clinton, 2011). Due to this, China sought to expand its influences in the Indian Ocean and a developed the country greater role in regional security as well as taking advantage of the small and failed states along the rim. The region was not without issues, as sea robberies were a major problem and the anxiety of maritime security domains which the group is targeting merchant vessels, valuable cargo and restraining crews for ransom has made the Indian Ocean unpredictable with power politics and non-traditional security issues.

Map 7 MSP Area of Operation



Source: <https://goo.gl/images/zgDprC>

The Malacca Strait is considered as the most active SLOC in the region and requires to be monitored for non-traditional security threat especially sea piracy and trans-border crimes (Collin 2015). Thus, the trilateral initiative were established, showed by the commitment of the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia since 2004. The Map 7 had shown that the MSP Area of Operation. The operation was designed to guarantee as a security element for the commercial vessels that go through the narrow that strait securely. However, the case of pirates attacks in Southeast Asia had been escalated up to 141 with most had occurred in the Malacca Straits in 2014.²² Singapore has desperate due to investing in maritime security due to make sure the safety of sea lanes. While Indonesia had become less dependent to the Malacca Strait, and it remains actives on its maritime sovereignty. Despite that, that strait is still within Indonesia's maritime region and serve to show vital interests in the Malacca Strait (Weatherby 2014).

In the SCS, China has taken aggressive action on its claimed territory and caused tension among the ASEAN members such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines (Satake 2017). While the tensions between China and Japan in the east, are constantly overwhelming due to territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since 2014. The territorial dispute over the Natuna Island is an Indonesian stepping-stone that enhances its country's maritime defence system (Afrida 2015). In addition, Indonesia will formally negotiate with China to resolve the territorial dispute issue and will drag China into the international tribunal if unsuccessful. However, the contentious territorial dispute in the SCS will only cause problems in the future. Therefore, Indonesia will continue and maintain the collaboration with China for economic interest through the GMA policy.

(V) Coordination within Indonesia's Government of Department

Vulnerable to cooperation and communication issues between Indonesia central government and other regional entities, they were still issues for the development of the facilities in construction (Stefanie 2016). For example, Indonesia's Public Partnership (PPP) had to produce 40 licenses and above as well as also licenses by other government agencies to conduct the development.

²²Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. (2018). *International Maritime Organization*. Retrieved May 22, 2018, from [http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmed Robbery/Pages/Default.aspx](http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmed%20Robbery/Pages/Default.aspx).

The PPP projects also requires approval for commercial licenses, an agreement for technical projects, acquire an operating permit and permits for construction projects. The *Jawa Tengah Power Project* had required the approvals from more than 50 licenses and permits before they embark the construction. Moreover, Indonesia's government also has an arguably complicated procedures to for the approval of agencies constructions permit.

Thus, the Committee for Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery (KPPIP) is necessary to plan via cooperation among agencies, observes and immediately execution process (Utomo 2016). The KPPIP had authority for selection of National Strategic Project and it is able for increasing up the infrastructures as prescribed by Presidential Regulation No. 3/2016 on the Acceleration of the Implementation of National Strategic Projects. The Committee is chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and supported by the Minister of Finance, Minister of PPN (National Development Planning) / Head of Bappenas (National Development Planning Agency) and Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning. However, it remains that KPPIP's the challenges of infrastructure investment in the country.

Although the Jokowi's GMA was focused on the development and physical infrastructure, there were problems to enhance the policy because of the sophistication within local maritime security agencies (Agastia 2017). Currently, Indonesia has 13 different agencies to monitor the maritime security area, but there are issues of overlapping authorities and coordination issues among agencies. This includes the vital agencies such as TNI-AL, POLRI, BAKAMLA, Custom and Civil Service. These agencies are still unsure of its vision which is far from cooperating under a single command, lack of sharing intelligence and restricted communication.

In 2014, the TNI-AL had seized two vessels *Bina Marine 75* tugboat and *Bina Marine 76* barge for suspected smuggling and TNI-AL reserves the right to detain any suspicious vessels in Indonesia's maritime territory.²³ However, smuggling is under Customs jurisdiction and has resulted in legal overlaps as there is no clear direction. Furthermore, these agencies often conflict with each other regarding the legal redundancies and compounded by the ego attitude among

²³ TNI-AL Amankan Kapal Pengangkut Ratusan Kontainer Berisi Timah di Batam. (2014, March 9). *news.detik.com*. Retrieved May 30, 2018, from <https://news.detik.com/berita/2520124/tni-al-amankan-kapal-pengangkut-ratusan-kontainer-berisi-timah-di-batam>.

them. Therefore, the government requires the restructuring of a new law in line with current maritime security. The aim of new legal is clearing up the redundancies in the maritime law area and allow the agencies to focus their specific tasks (Agastia 2017).

Major Power responses towards GMA Policy

(A) Maritime Cooperation

On 24th October 2015, The US and Indonesia had marked the Strategic Partnership in Maritime Sector for an upgrade a further collaboration with maritime security, financial, administration of mineral assets and fisheries, science and innovation and other participation both of nations in the future.²⁴ Under the agreement, the two nations will investigate the formation of public-private associations, a business roundtable trade and facilitated an economical fisheries improvement and the Indonesian port. The US likewise promised to give help the preservation of marine biodiversity, supportable fisheries administration, and great administration of maritime assets in nearby, territorial, commonplace, and national levels in Indonesia. The exertion will focus on three regions in Eastern Indonesia with the most noteworthy marine biodiversity.²⁵

Amid the Prime Minister of Japan's visit to Indonesia in 2017, Abe has expressed that Japan will advance the sea security respective organization and to effectively advance the improvement of Indonesia's remote islands.²⁶ In light of Japan's debate with China towards Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Ocean, Japanese has bolstered Indonesia's activity to guard its power towards the Natuna Islands. Moreover, Indonesia and Japan had made consent to dispatch collaboration structures incorporating into maritime security and monetary advancement in 2016. Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Fumio Kashiwa had reported that the collaboration with

²⁴ US and Indonesia Sign MOU on Maritime Cooperation. (2015, October 27). *World Maritime News*. Retrieved May 11, 2018, from <https://worldmaritimeneeds.com/archives/174859/us-and-indonesia-sign-mou-on-maritime-cooperation/>.

²⁵ US and Indonesia Sign MOU on Maritime Cooperation. (2015, October 27). *World Maritime News*.

²⁶ Indonesia, Japan to deepen defence ties amid China challenge. (2017, January 15). *The Straits Times*. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-japan-to-deepen-defence-ties-amid-china-challenge>.

Indonesia is exceedingly critical and the point is encouraged to reinforce Indonesia's maritime capacity and advance in addition to a financial improvement in Indonesia's island.²⁷

On 14th December 2017 was held The 10th Technical Committee Meeting between Indonesia and China in Jakarta, Indonesia.²⁸ The meeting is reflected upon a part of the agreement on the maritime operation was signed in 2012. The significance of the meeting is to strengthen the maritime cooperation for both countries and recalled the progress of maritime cooperation projects. The progress project that has been highlighted is an infrastructure for Training Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) in Lombok and Sunda Straits, Joint Exercise Indonesia-China Search and Rescue (SAR) in maritime operation and Navy to Navy Operation. The meeting also discussed topics such as maritime security, maritime law by local enforcement, marine biological research and development, and other both countries' cooperation to maintain maritime security and stability domains. China's Ambassador Lan Lijun had stressed that the maritime cooperation with Indonesia is a role model in the ASEAN region for current and next future plans.²⁹

On 5th January 2018, Indonesia and India had consented to fortify vital organizations, including defence, security, economy and maritime at the Fifth Indonesia-India Joint Commission meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia (Sheanny 2018). Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi had talked about approaches to widen our organizations, including by speeding up the finish of safeguarding collaboration understandings. In the meeting, they were likewise talked about and consented to reinforce maritime participation to fight piracy and illegal fishing. The two nations will likewise cooperate to counter terrorism through Deradicalization Programs and enhance a lawful structure to defeat the transnational organized crimes including Cyber-Attacks. Indonesia and India likewise consented to accelerate transactions on EEZ and initiative, participation to elevate exchange and investigate other exchange possibilities through greater market access.

²⁷ Japan, Indonesia to cooperate on maritime security. (2016, December 21). *The Straits Times*. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-indonesia-to-cooperate-on-maritime-security>.

²⁸ Indonesia-China Discussed Progress on Maritime Technical Cooperation. (2017, December 15). *Indonesian MoFA*. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/berita-perwakilan/Pages/Indonesia-China-Discussed-Progress-on-Maritime-Technical-Cooperation-.aspx>.

²⁹ Indonesia-China Discussed Progress on Maritime Technical Cooperation. (2017, December 15). *Indonesian MoFA*.

They will likewise try to enhance speculation offices in numerous divisions, including the drug store and mining.

On 10th February 2017, Indonesia and Singapore have brought into force had agreed to the maritime boundary treaty during the 50th anniversary of bilateral relations (Ho 2017). This is continuity for bilateral treaty had been made since 2014 which limit of the territorial border in the Strait of Singapore. The agreement is a significant milestone in Singapore's bilateral relations with Indonesia. The 2014 agreement provides for freedom of navigation in the 9.5km sea at the Singapore Straits for both countries. This agreement is a continuation with two other agreements were signed in 1973 and 2009. In addition, the agreement includes collaboration with other sectors such as tourism, energy and the establishment of the Indonesia-Singapore Business Council. Both countries also agreed to further strengthen cooperation in areas of mutual benefit.

Indonesia and Australia have developed their relationship especially on military collaboration has been completely re-established after Indonesia forced an impermanent freeze before the end of last year and both countries have shown its consent to the full restoration of defence participation and bilateral exchange training exercises. They have likewise featured the marking of a Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation would be followed by an arrangement of maritime activities. The joint committee is also focused on the need to continue with the freedom of navigation in the SCS domains (Snow 2017).


(B) Economic Cooperation

In the economic aspect, Indonesia had projected the government Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to forecasts an increasing at 5% per year from 2016-2020. This forecast, which Indonesia had projected with an estimated GDP exceeding USD1 trillion.³⁰ In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) had a tremendous impact on the Indonesian economy is the most affected and causes the Indonesian economy to shrink by 13% (Tambunan 2010). Primarily, the two significant events which occurred in relative quick successions such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the

³⁰ GDP of 4 ASEAN nations to exceed \$1 trillion by 2030. (2016, April 14). *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved May 13, 2018, from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/04/14/gdp-of-4-ASEAN-nations-to-exceed-1-trillion-by-2030.html>.

Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had to give an impact to Indonesia's economic recovery in 2008. In addition, the Nangaroe Aceh Darussalam Province as agricultural produce has reduced by 2% of the overall GDP of Indonesia. This is because the region became interested and active in the manufacture of building materials (Lucichand Houston 2017). Following the AFC, Indonesia has maintained positive growth and begin to evaluate which sectors will improve or affect the country's economy in the future (Kian 2012).

Table 1 The Breakdown of Direct Foreign Investment in Indonesia



Source: <https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/iGpl2HyIhUqQ/v2/800x-1.png>.

As regard Table 1, Singapore is a major trading and investment partner for channeling financial assistance to mega projects in Indonesia's infrastructure development currently (Ishak 2016). In return, Indonesia has invested directly in Singapore to increase from USD 638 million in 2010 to USD 2.4 billion in 2014. In 2015, Japan announced that channeling the official development of 140 billion yen (USD 1.17 billion) for the construction of the Indonesian rail network. Jokowi has successfully joined into Beijing's One Belt, One Road aspirations to enhance a maximum investment in order to support of his infrastructure development based on the Indonesia National

Strategic Program (Gosman 2016).³¹ In 2011, China became Indonesia's largest trading partner, but China became the third main investor in Indonesia after Singapore and Japan in 2016 (Jose 2017).³²

In 2015, the United States was the fourth major investor in Indonesia, 4% of total foreign direct investment accumulated in Indonesia 2005-2015. While the shortlisted main investors are from Singapore with 42%, Japan with 28% and the UK of 5%, which USD 400 million from USD 2.4 billion in 2013 and decreased from USD 3.4 billion in 2005 to USD 444 million. As Diagram 5 regards, Indonesia's economic interest with the US is increasing, economic interest with other counterparts (e.g., Singapore, China and South Korea) also increase positively (Yan 2016). Based on the official report of the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), the US had invested USD 1.16 billion in 540 projects in Indonesia during 2016 (Susanty 2017).

Conclusion

Obviously, the GMA policy is a concept to enhance the economy and spread Indonesia's political influence in the PACINDO region. The new policy also as required to remain Indonesia's maritime sovereignty as well as control over the sea resources, while also ensuring safety in maritime security. Furthermore, the moderate of Indonesia's foreign policy is based on a careful calculation of national interests in Indonesia, which is potential for the dominant power in the PACINDO region. Indonesia's Strategy to aspiring country's maritime domain for a long-term investment with the ability to develop a comprehensive maritime domain. Thus, Indonesia required by encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation with among regional countries. This is an alternative approach which improves the economy positively. Additionally, the ability of the president and the government gave positive cooperation and commitment to the reconstruction of their country. However, Indonesia is facing the variety of challenges in strategic level and problems of the multiple security threats. To address the security challenges either internal or external, Indonesia always cautious in addressing the challenges, especially dealing

³¹ Building Indonesia's future Unblocking the pipeline of infrastructure projects. (2015). *Oxford Economics*. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from <https://www.pwc.com/asia-practice/publications/pwc-outlookunblocking-the-pipeline-of-infrastructure-projects-c.pdf>.

³² Why Indonesia Is Chasing China's Billions. (2016, November 1). *Bloomberg News*. Retrieved May 28, 2018, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-31/china-deepens-economic-ties-with-indonesia-asinvestment-doubles>.

with the major power such the US and China. However, Indonesia still remains tied for own benefit by providing comprehensive cooperation with regional countries in order to gain earn the trust and continued with ambition as a maritime country. At the same time, Indonesia's role in the region is also supported via the modernization of its defence force. It is important to realize that Indonesia as a main player in the region and expand its wide geographic territory.

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